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Abstract
Spatial partial equilibrium models incorporating conjectural variations are widely
used to analyze the development of oligopolistic multi-agent markets, such as interna-
tional energy and raw material markets. Although this model type can produce multiple
equilibria under commonly used assumptions, to the best of our knowledge, the conse-
quences for the interpretation of the model results have not yet been explored in detail.
To this end, we derive a linear complementarity model for the gas market and discuss un-
der which assumptions on the model structure a component of the solution is unique. In
particular, we find that the gas flow between a trader and a consumer is unique whenever
the trader is modeled to exert market power in the consumer’s market. We demonstrate
our findings by computing the extreme points of the polyhedral solution space and show
that erroneous conclusions could be drawn whenever only one (arbitrary) point in the
solution space is picked for interpretation. Furthermore, we discuss whether economi-
cally meaningful parameter value changes exist which would enforce uniqueness in all
components of the solution.
Keywords: OR in energy, Conjectural variations, Existence and uniqueness of
solutions, Natural gas market, Linear complementarity program
1. Introduction
Spatial partial equilibrium models including conjectural variations (SPE-CV models)
are a popular tool to investigate oligopolistic markets, such as fossil fuel or electricity
markets [39, 6, 31]. These markets are characterized by a high capital intensity as a
result of high exploration costs, long lead times, large distances between producing and
consuming regions, or expensive infrastructure requirements. This creates high barriers
to entry and limits the competition, which allows major traders to exert market power
over consumers.
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In SPE-CV models, multiple traders are distinguished to represent the impact of
market power exertion. As a consequence, one of the model outcomes are the sales of the
individual traders to consumers, which is of interest in practice, because it indicates which
two parties are likely to trade in a given situation. Unfortunately, this representation may
also introduce redundancies to the model, mathematically corresponding to the existence
of multiple solutions for a given set of parameters, and economically to the existence of
multiple market equilibria in a single situation. This is problematic when it comes to the
interpretation of the model results, since one could not determine which, of the possibly
many, equilibria proposed by the model become reality.
In the presented study we investigate SPE-CV models for gas markets. Several vari-
ants have been proposed in the past, including the special cases of Cournot and Bertrand
competition. The most prominent examples are the dynamic GASTALE model by Lise &
Hobbs [32], and the World Gas Model (WGM) by Egging et al. [9]: both models assume
international gas traders to exert market power over consumers, and compete perfectly for
infrastructure services such as transmission or storage capacity. The dynamic GASTALE
model [33, 30] and the WGM [51, 18, 10, 11, 17, 8, 21, 37] were expanded successively
and used for various case studies.
However, in most articles, the multiplicity of solutions is not discussed. Exceptions
include Gabriel et al. [16], who analyzed a predecessor of the WGM and derived unique-
ness criteria for the intermediate and wholesale prices, and Egging [11], who presented
an example in which non-unique service prices can arise in the WGM. To the best of
our knowledge, the remaining variables, particularly the volume flows, have not yet re-
ceived any attention. The contribution of this article is to analyze the multiplicity of
all variables by exploiting the information hidden in the mathematical structure of the
problem. For the non-unique variables, we discuss whether uniqueness is relevant for
interpretation in the first place, and investigate how uniqueness could be achieved based
on changes in the model’s parameter values.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. In the next section, we introduce
a SPE-CV model for the gas market. In Section 3, we substantially reduce the number
of equations by expressing (infrastructure) service prices and volume flows explicitly.
Service cost functions are affine or quadratic in the volume flows, allowing the model
to be represented as a linear complementarity problem. Subsequently, we carry out
the mathematical analysis concerning the multiplicity of solutions. In Section 4, we
demonstrate our findings via a numerical example. In Section 5, we discuss our theoretical
and numerical results, and in Section 6, we summarize and conclude our work.
2. Model description
2.1. General setting and notation
The structure of our SPE-CV model comprises nodes and arcs, and distinguishes
multiple time periods within a year. The nodes represent countries or regions, in which
gas is produced, stored, and sold to consumers. The arcs represent the gas flow capacities
from one region to another. The differentiation of time periods allows for a distinction
of multiple levels of demand. The geographical and temporal granularity and range of
the model can be adjusted to fit the requirements of a specific case; in the numerical
example presented in Section 4, the world-wide gas trade over a year is represented by
50 nodes, 291 arcs, and 2 time periods (summer and winter half-year).
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While SPE-CV models are certainly able to capture the main properties of the gas
market such as limited production, restricted transport capabilities, large seasonal de-
mand fluctuations, and market power exerting traders, they do not provide any informa-
tion on the status of the gas market within a node, implicitly assuming that the gas is
distributed well and prices are uniform. If the region mapping to a node is chosen suffi-
ciently small, this weakness can be compensated to some extent. Since publicly available
data for some of the parameters, particularly production capacities and wholesale prices,
is mostly limited to country-level, a finer granularity is rarely aimed for with SPE-CV
models. Other types of models, such as the TIGER model [35, 34, 36, 7], or the model
introduced by Carvalho et al. [3], circumvent this data constraint by assuming a fixed
and therefore price-independent demand; this eliminates the need for accurate wholesale
price data and hence allows for a higher model resolution.
The mathematical formulation is inspired by other models in the field, particularly
the deterministic version of the WGM proposed by Egging [11], except that we refrain
from modeling investments over time. In comparison to the WGM, we aim for a more
compact representation of the overall model to facilitate the mathematical analysis, and
therefore choose a more general notation for the individual components of the model to
emphasize their similarity. The notation is introduced as we formulate the model, and
summarized in Tables A.1-A.5. An exemplary model with two interconnected nodes is
depicted in Figure 2.1.
The nodes n,m ∈ N , n 6= m represent countries or regions, and the time periods are
denoted t ∈ T . In each node n, a consumer Cn, a gas producing company Pn, a storage
operator Sn, a liquefaction plant operator Ln, and a regasification plant operator Rn
may be located. The storage operator Sn provides two services: injection of gas (In),
and extraction of gas (Xn). A transmission system operator Anm manages the flows
in the pipelines from n to m, and a shipping company Bnm transports liquefied natural
gas (LNG) from n tom. To simplify notation in the remainder of this paper, we introduce
Zz as a placeholder for a producer or a infrastructure service Z in a node/arc z, thus
Z ∈ {P, I,X, L,R,A,B}, and z ∈ Z, where Z is the corresponding subset of nodes/arcs
in which a service1 of type Z is active. Note that each service Zz represents all companies
of type Z in a node/arc z, even if in reality multiple firms carry out this activity in the
geographical region of z. Similarly, Cn represents the aggregated demand of all consumers
located in node n.
In most of the large companies, gas is produced in one division, and then internally
transferred to the trading-arm of the company, which deals with the (international) trade
and distribution. Each of these companies’ trading-arm is modeled by a trader Fn, which
receives gas only from the producer Pn located in its home-node. Each Fn spreads out
from his home-node through the network, thereby competes with the other traders for
service capacities (except production capacities), and finally sells gas in the consumer
markets, where it again competes with the other traders for market shares. While we
assume all services to be price-takers, the traders exert market power in the consumer
markets, which is modeled based on a conjectural variations approach.
1Although producers are not an infrastructure service, we henceforth include them in our notion of
services.
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Figure 2.1: Gas market model with two nodes. P : producer. A: pipeline operator. L: liquefaction plant
operator. B: LNG shipment. R: regasification plant operator. S: storage operator. C: consumer. Fn:
trader associated with producer Pn. Fm: trader associated with producer Pm. qPfnt: quantity delivered
from producer to trader f at node n in time period t. qA
fnmt
: pipeline transportation of trader f via arc
nm in period t. qB
fnmt
: LNG shipment of trader f via arc nm in period t. qI
fnt
: storage injection by
trader f at node n in period t. qX
fnt
: storage extraction by trader f at node n in period t. qC
fnt
: sales by
trader f to consumer in node n in period t. The traders Fn and Fm, there decision variables, and their
corresponding producers Pn and Pm are colored red (n) and blue (m), respectively. Service providers,
except producers, and flows between them are marked purple, as well as the consumers, since all traders
trade with them.
2.2. Mathematical derivation
The traders and service providers have perfect and complete information about the
market. Therefore, the decision processes of the traders and the service providers can
be modeled as (deterministic) optimization problems. In the following, we introduce
the optimization problem of the traders (Section 2.2.1), the optimization problem of the
service providers (Section 2.2.2), and the market clearing conditions (Section 2.2.3).
2.2.1. Optimization problem of the traders
The goal of each trader f is to maximize profit ΠFf , which is equal to total revenue
TRFf from sales to the consumers, minus the total cost TC
F
f arising from using services:
ΠFf = TR
F
f − TC
F
f . (2.1)
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f ∈ F represents an arbitrary trader in the set of all traders (whereas Fn is the specific
trader whose home base is in node n). The total revenue of trader f reads
TRFf =
∑
t∈T
∑
n∈C(f)
[(
1− θCfnt
)
λCnt + θ
C
fntΛ
C
nt(·)
]
qCfnt. (2.2)
The decision variables are all the qCfnt which represent the total amount of gas sold to
the consumers in node n and period t. The quantity is multiplied by the corresponding
wholesale price, and the product is summed over all periods T and over the set of nodes
C(f) in which the trader f and a consumer are present. The wholesale price comprises
the weighted sum of two quantities: the price on the wholesale market λCnt, which is
determined by the market clearing conditions and is exogenous to the trader; and the
inverse demand function ΛCnt, a function of the total demand
∑
f∈F(n)
qCfnt, on which the
trader has influence via its decision variable qCfnt. The weight θ
C
fnt ∈ [0, 1] is referred to
as the behavioral parameter of market power [46, Chapter 12] of trader f over consumers
located in node n in period t: if θCfnt = 1 for all traders f , the market n in period t is
characterized by a Cournot equilibrium, whereas θCfnt = 0 for all traders f indicates a
competitive equilibrium. Conceptually following the setting used by Egging et al. [10]
for the WGM, we also allow values 0 < θCfnt < 1, representing intermediate stages of
the traders’ conjectures about the other traders’ behaviors2. However, we do not allow
θCfnt > 1 and hence exclude cartelization of multiple traders.
The inverse demand function in node n and period t is defined as
ΛCnt(·) := INT
C
nt + SLP
C
nt
∑
f∈F(n)
qCfnt. (2.3)
INTCnt represents the intercept of the inverse demand function, which corresponds to
the maximum willingness to pay of consumers at node n in period t, SLPCnt is the
slope and is assumed strictly negative. These parameters are derived from the reference
willingness to pay WTPCnt, reference demand DMD
C
nt, and price elasticity ηnt, which in
turn is calculated from the price elasticities of the residential & commercial, industrial
and power sectors and their reference shares SHRCnd,· in consumption.
INTCnt =(1−
1
ηCnt
) ·WTPCnt ≥ 0 (2.4)
SLPCnt =
WTPCnt
DMDCnt · η
C
nt
< 0 (2.5)
ηCnt =η
C
nd,res · SHR
C
nd,res + η
C
nd,ind · SHR
C
nd,ind + η
C
nd,el · SHR
C
nd,el < 0 (2.6)
All parameters can vary in n and t if the respective data is available. Following previous
works of Lise et al. [33] (dynamic GASTALE model) and Egging et al. [10] (WGM), the
2There are different propositions how values of θC
fnt
different from 0 and 1 should be interpreted, see
for example Perloff et al. [41, Chapter 3] for a discussion. In this work, we follow the interpretation of
Tremblay & Tremblay [46, Chapter 12] and think of θC
fnt
as ”toughness of competition”, where decreasing
θC
fnt
indicates increasing competition.
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inverse demand function is chosen affine; for a market analysis including more general
structures of inverse demand functions we refer to Abolhassani et al. [1].
For each trader f , the total cost arising from service utilization can be written as
TCFf =
∑
Z∈{P,A,R,B,L,I,X}
∑
t∈T
∑
z∈Z(f)
λZztq
Z
fzt, (2.7)
where the qZfzt are the decision variables of the traders and represent the volume flows
between trader f and service provider Zz, λ
Z
zt is the market price for using the service
Zz (exogenous to the trader), and Z(f) is the set of nodes/arcs at which the trader f
and a service provider of type Z are both present. Note that
qLfnt ≡
∑
m∈B(n)
qBfnmt
LOSSLn
, and
qRfmt ≡
∑
n∈B(m)
LOSSBnmq
B
fnmt,
where qLfnt, q
B
fnmt, and q
R
fmt are the flows at arrival at the service providers, and LOSS
L
n
and LOSSBnm are the loss factors from liquefaction and shipment; q
L
fnt and q
R
fmt will
therefore be substituted for the remainder of this work.
Each trader’s profit maximization is subject to several volume balances to ensure that
the solution is reasonable: per trader f , all inflows have to match the outflows in each
node n and each period t, and the yearly inflows into a storage unit have to be equal to
the outflows in each node n.
hF1fnt =q
P
fnt + q
X
fnt +
∑
m∈A(n)
LOSSAmnq
A
fmnt +
∑
m∈B(n)
LOSSBmnLOSS
R
n q
B
fmnt
− qIfnt − q
C
fnt −
∑
m∈A(n)
qAfnmt −
∑
m∈B(n)
qBfnmt
LOSSLn
= 0
(
φNfnt
)
∀n, t
(2.8)
hF2fn =
∑
t∈T
LOSS Inq
I
fnt −
∑
t∈T
qXfnt = 0
(
φSfn
)
∀n (2.9)
Some incoming and outgoing flows are multiplied and divided, respectively, by LOSSZz ∈
(0, 1], to account for incurring transaction losses. φNfnt and φ
S
fn are the associated dual
variables (Lagrange multipliers).
Finally, all the decision variables qCfnt and q
Z
fzt can be upper and lower bounded due
to contracts, certain policies, sanctions, etc. We state these equations in the following,
but for simplicity of notation will neglect them for the remainder of the paper.
qCfnt ≤UPP
C
fnt
(
ξ
C
fnt
)
∀f, n, t (2.10)
qCfnt ≥LOW
C
fnt
(
ξC
fnt
)
∀f, n, t (2.11)
qZfzt ≤UPP
Z
fzt
(
ξ
Z
fzt
)
∀f, z, t (2.12)
qZfzt ≥LOW
Z
fzt
(
ξZ
fzt
)
∀f, z, t (2.13)
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2.2.2. Optimization problem of the service providers
Each service provider Zz determines the total volume contracted to traders s
Z
zt by
maximizing profits ΠZz over all time periods t:
max
sZzt≥0
ΠZz =
∑
t∈T
(
λZzts
Z
zt − c
Z
zt(s
Z
zt)
)
(2.14)
s.t. gZ1zt = CAP
Z
zt − s
Z
zt ≥ 0
(
αZzt
)
∀t (2.15)
gZ2z = CAP
ZT
z −
∑
t∈T
sZzt ≥ 0
(
αZTz
)
. (2.16)
cZzt(s
Z
zt) are the costs arising for the service provider Zz by contracting s
Z
zt and are assumed
to be convex and twice differentiable, CAP
Z
zt and CAP
ZT
z are the service providers’
capacity limits per time period t and per year, and αZzt and α
ZT
z are the dual variables
associated with the capacity constraints. As stated above, λZzt is the market price for
using the service and is exogenous to the service provider.
Note that gX2n can be used to model the working gas volume of a storage: CAP
XT
n −∑
t∈T
sXnt ≥ 0, where CAP
XT
n is the maximum storable working gas in node n. Limiting
the total extractable gas is equal to limiting the total storable gas under the assumption
that the injection and extraction periods are separated, and the maximum storage level
is reached at most once per year. This is clearly true when modeling up to t = 3 periods
per year, but mostly also holds for t > 3 in reality. Also, the traders have perfect foresight
over the entire simulation period, and therefore it is not necessary to specify whether
the withdrawal or the injection period is first in the simulation. It suffices to ensure that
the storage levels are equal or higher at the end of a storage cycle than before, which
is guaranteed in equilibrium by Equations (2.9) and (2.16). To model the storage more
accurately, additional constraints can be introduced in the formulation without affecting
the theoretical conclusions, as long as they are affine in the decision variables.
2.2.3. Market clearing conditions
These conditions couple the decision variables of the traders (qZfzt) and the service
providers (sZzt). By enforcing market clearance in every node n and period t, the dual
variables of these equations, the market prices λZzt, are determined:
hM1zt = s
Z
zt −
∑
f∈F(z)
qZfzt = 0
(
λZzt
)
. (2.17)
Furthermore, in all nodes n and periods t we enforce clearing of the wholesale markets:
hM2nt = λ
C
nt − Λ
C
nt(·) = 0
(
λCnt
)
. (2.18)
2.3. Mixed complementarity problem formulation
We derive the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions of the optimization problems of the
traders and service providers, and complement them with the market clearing conditions.
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This leads to Problem (2.19) which takes the format of a mixed non-linear complemen-
tarity program.
0 ≤−
∂ΠFf
∂qZfzt
−
∑
n′∈N (f)
∑
t′∈T
φNfn′t′
∂hF1fn′t′
∂qZfzt
−
∑
n′∈N (f)
φSfn′
∂hF2fn′
∂qZfzt
⊥ qZfzt ≥ 0 ∀f, z, t
(2.19a)
0 ≤−
∂ΠFf
∂qCfnt
−
∑
n′∈N (f)
∑
t′∈T
φNfn′t′
∂hF1fn′t′
∂qCfnt
−
∑
n′∈N (f)
φSfn′
∂hF2fn′
∂qCfnt
⊥ qCfnt ≥ 0 ∀f, n, t
(2.19b)
0 = hF1fnt ⊥ φ
N
fnt (free) ∀f, n, t
(2.19c)
0 = hF2fn ⊥ φ
S
fn (free) ∀f, n
(2.19d)
0 ≤ −
∂ΠZz
∂sZzt
−
∑
t′∈T
αZzt′
∂gZ1zt′
∂sZzt
− αZTz
∂gZ2z
∂sZzt
⊥ sZzt ≥ 0 ∀z, t (2.19e)
0 ≤ gZ1zt ⊥ α
Z
zt ≥ 0 ∀z, t (2.19f)
0 ≤ gZ2z ⊥ α
TZ
z ≥ 0 ∀z (2.19g)
0 = hM1zt ⊥ λ
Z
zt (free) ∀z, t
(2.19h)
0 = hM2nt ⊥ λ
C
nt (free) ∀n, t
(2.19i)
A solution to Problem (2.19) is simultaneously an optimal solution to the problems of all
the traders and service providers. The solution represents a Nash equilibrium, in which
all traders and service providers optimize their volume flows given the other traders’
and service providers’ decisions, and no party has an incentive to move away from the
equilibrium.
3. Existence and uniqueness of solutions
In this section, we address the mathematical characteristics of Model (2.19), particu-
larly the existence and uniqueness properties of its solution. Before we start, we restate
the model in a more compact way by eliminating superfluous variables, specifying the
cost functions, and setting all loss factors LOSSZz = 1.
3.1. Compact model representation
First, we want to reduce the number of variables and equations by substituting the
decision variables of the service providers sZzt and the service prices λ
Z
zt and eliminating
Equations (2.19e) and (2.19h). This saves programming time, simplifies maintenance,
and potentially reduces calculation times. Since hM1zt = 0 for all arcs/nodes z and time
periods t, we can immediately set sZzt :=
∑
f∈F(z)
qZfzt for all z, t and eliminate Equation
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(2.19h). The wholesale prices λCzt and Equation (2.19i) could be substituted/eliminated
in a similar way, however, we refrain from applying these changes to obtain a more
favorable mathematical representation of the model for the derivation of our results.
Eliminating the service prices λZzt and Equation (2.19e) is somewhat more involved.
We consider the complementarity constraint (2.19e) and distinguish two cases: for a
specific z, t, either
(i) sZzt > 0 =⇒ λ
Z
zt =
dcZzt(s
Z
zt)
dsZzt
+ αZzt + α
ZT
z , or
(ii) sZzt = 0 =⇒ λ
Z
zt ≤
dcZzt(s
Z
zt)
dsZzt
+ αZzt + α
ZT
z =
dcZzt(s
Z
zt)
dsZzt
∣∣∣
sZzt=0
, the marginal costs for
service provider Zz at zero throughput. α
Z
zt = 0 and α
ZT
z = 0 under the assumption
that CAP
Z
zt > 0 and CAP
ZT
z > 0, which is reasonable, since otherwise the variable
sZzt would not have been introduced in the first place.
Hence, we set the service price λZzt :=
dcZzt(s
Z
zt)
dsZzt
+ αZzt + α
ZT
z for all z, t regardless of the
contracted volume flow sZzt being greater or equal to zero. This is an easily justifiable
change to the model, since the only expected change in the output is that the service
price λZzt is also unambiguous for nonoperating services Zz.
Second, for homogeneity of notation we relax Equalities (2.19c), (2.19d), and (2.19i)
to hF1fnt ≥ 0, h
F2
fn ≥ 0, and h
M2
nt ≥ 0, and simultaneously force non-negativity on the
respective dual variables. This reformulation does not change the outcome of the model:
we expect hF1fnt = h
F2
fn = 0 in equilibrium, because the trader would otherwise be wasting
gas, which is never optimal because production costs are assumed positive. Furthermore,
in equilibrium we either have hM2nt = 0 and wholesale prices λ
C
nt ≥ 0 (as before), or
hM2nt > 0 and λ
C
nt = 0 (instead of h
M2
nt = 0 and λ
C
nt < 0). But since it is never optimal for
traders to sell gas at λCnt ≤ 0 due to production cost being larger than zero, the second
situation never arises. In reality, these assumptions may not always hold: it may be
cheaper for a supplier to flare superfluous gas or sell gas at negative prices than reducing
production. However, in our framework we do not impose any constraints which would
lead to such behavior (as for instance ramp constraints), and therefore hF1fnt 6= 0, h
F2
fn 6= 0,
and hM2nt 6= 0 never result in our model, even after relaxation.
Third, we define the cost functions of the service providers cZzt(s
Z
zt) such that suffi-
ciency and necessity of the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions is preserved. Hence, cZzt(s
Z
zt)
have to be convex and differentiable. In recent studies [17, 38, 4] we find that the cost
functions are chosen affine, except for production for which a quadratic and a logarithmic
term is added to represent the sharp increase in cost close to the capacity limit. (The
quadratic and the logarithmic term are both convex.) We adopt these cost structures, ex-
cept that we omit the logarithmic term in the production cost functions. This allows the
problem to be represented as linear complementarity problem while maintaining strict
convexity in the production cost function. The derivatives of our cost functions read
dcZ
′
zt (s
Z′
zt )
dsZ
′
zt
= LINCZ
′
zt , Z
′ ∈ Z \ {P} ∀z, t, (3.1)
dcPnt(s
P
nt)
dsPnt
= LINCPnt +QUAC
P
nts
P
nt (3.2)
= LINCPnt +QUAC
P
ntq
P
fnt ∀n, t, (3.3)
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where LINCZzt and QUAC
Z
zt are the linear and quadratic cost function terms for service
Z located at node/arc z in period t. Note that the last equality holds because every
trader has only one associated producer (Section 2.1).
We state the full problem including all mentioned changes in Appendix B. After
dividing the left-hand side of Equation (B.1k) by the slope of the inverse demand curve
SLPCnt, the problem can be brought into the following form:
Mx+ b  0, (3.4a)
x  0, (3.4b)
xT (Mx+ b) = 0, (3.4c)
M :=


D −ET −FT −GT
E 0 0 0
F 0 0 0
G 0 0 H

 , x :=


q
α
φ
λ

 , b :=


bq
bα
bφ
bλ

 , (3.4d)
where M ∈ Rp×p, x ∈ Rp, and b ∈ Rp. As usual, ,,≻,≺ are interpreted component-
wise. The components of x are defined as
q =


qP
qI
qX
qA
qB
qC


, α =
[
αZ
αZT
]
, φ =
[
φN
φS
]
, λ =
[
λC
]
, (3.5)
where each sub-component of q, α, φ and λ is again a vector containing all variables of its
respective type, for example the vector qP contains all the produced volumes qPfnt and is of
appropriate dimension. The first block row ofM and bq corresponds to Equations (B.1a)
- (B.1f) and contains the stationarity conditions of the traders’ optimization problems
(with substituted service prices λZzt). Eq+bα corresponds to Equations (B.1i) and (B.1j),
and consists of the primal feasibility constraints of the service providers’ problems (with
substituted decision variables sZzt). Fq+ bφ corresponds to Equations (B.1g) and (B.1h),
comprising the primal feasibility constraints of the traders’ problems. Gq + Hλ + bλ
corresponds to the wholesale market clearing conditions contained in Equations (B.1k).
Note that the inverse demand functions ΛCnt(·) have to be affine for all n and t to represent
Model (2.19) by Equations (3.4). Some of the sub-matrices of M and b have special
properties: D is diagonal and positive semi-definite, E  0, G  0, H is diagonal and
positive definite, bq  0, bα ≻ 0, bφ = 0, and bλ ≺ 0.
3.2. Existence of a solution
According to Cottle et al. [5, Theorem 3.1.2], a solution to Problem (3.4) exists if
(i) M is positive semi-definite,
(ii) a vector x exists satisfying Equations (3.4a) and (3.4b).
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Since
xTMx =
[
q α φ λ
]


D E F G
−ET 0 0 0
−FT 0 0 0
−GT 0 0 H




q
α
φ
λ

 (3.6)
= qTDq + λTHλ, (3.7)
Condition (i) is satisfied if D and H are positive (semi-) definite, which is indeed the
case.
Condition (ii) is proven by construction. We begin with x0 = 0, and by exploiting the
structure ofM and b we subsequently alter the components of x until we find x satisfying
Equations (3.4a) and (3.4b).
Iteration 1. x0 is not feasible, because −GT q0 +Hλ0 + bλ = bλ ≺ 0. Therefore, we set
λ1 = −H−1bλ =⇒ λCnt = SLP
C
nt ·
INT
C
nt
SLPCnt
= INTCnt ≥ 0. Hence, the components of x1
are:
q1 = 0, α1 = 0, φ1 = 0, λ1 = INT
C ,
where INTC is the vector containing the intercepts of the inverse demand curves INTCnt
at the positions corresponding to the indices n, t of the wholesale prices λ ≡ λC .
Iteration 2. We now consider the first block-row of inequalities: Dq1 + Eα1 + Fφ1 +
Gλ1 + bq = G · INT
C + bq 6 0, because we cannot guarantee bq  −G · INT
C . We set
φN2 := INT
C (again, INTC is a vector containing INTCnt at the corresponding indices),
which gives us
qT2 = 0, α
T
2 = 0, φ
N
2 = INT
C , φS2 = 0, λ2 = INT
C .
Iteration 3. Since F has both positive and negative entries, we have Fφ2  0 for some
lines of the first block-row. Since E  0, and at least one entry on each conflicting line
is greater than zero (this can be deduced from the Problem formulation (B.1)), we can
compensate for Fφ2  0 by setting the corresponding components of α sufficiently large:
α3 := INT
C =⇒ Eα  |−Fφ2|. This leads to a feasible x3:
q3 = 0, α3 = INT
C , φN3 = INT
C , φS3 = 0, λ3 = INT
C ,
which completes the proof of Condition (ii).
3.3. Characterization of the solution space
As stated in Cottle et al. [5, Theorem 3.3.7], Problem (3.4) attains a unique solution
for all vectors b if and only if M is a P-matrix3. This is clearly not the case as some
diagonal elements Mii = 0 independent of the parameter value choices. However, given
M +MT is diagonal, we can guarantee uniqueness of the solution x in component i if
3A matrix is a P-matrix if it has square form and all its principle minors are positive. This is the most
general class of matrices for which the linear complementarity program (3.4) attains a unique solution
for all vectors b. We refer to Cottle et al. [5, Chapter 3.3] for an in-depth discussion on P-matrices.
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the corresponding element Mii > 0; see Appendix C for a proof. The converse is not
necessarily true: xi may be unique even if Mii = 0 because the component is sufficiently
constrained by M and b.
Consequently, results are unique in at least the produced volume qP , the sold volume
qCfnt if the corresponding market power parameter θ
C
fnt > 0, and the wholesale price
λC . Furthermore, from Equation (2.18) and the properties of the inverse demand func-
tion (2.3)-(2.6), we can deduce that the total consumption in a node and time period∑
f∈F(n)
qCfnt is unique. By combining these results, we can conclude that the total sales of
perfectly competitive traders in a node and time period
∑
f∈{F(n)|θfnt=0}
qCfnt are unique,
including the special case of qCfnt being unique independently of θfnt if there is only one
trader f in the market in node n and time period t. Finally, unique produced volumes
qP imply that the sold volume qCfnt is unique if trader f only sells gas in one node and
one time period.
To determine uniqueness of xi for all i for specific instances of M and b we analyze
the solution space of the problem: Since M is positive semi-definite, the solution space
S is a convex polyhedron [5, Theorems 3.1.7 and 3.1.8] of the form
S = {x ∈ Rp+ :Mx+ b  0, b
T (x− xˆ) = 0, (M +MT )(x − xˆ) = 0}, (3.8)
where xˆ is an arbitrary solution. We have shown in Section 3.2 that a solution xˆ always
exists, hence the solution space can always be described by S.
We are now interested in the extreme points of S, particularly those attaining max-
imum or minimum values in (at least) one component: Let xi,+, xi,− ∈ S be vectors
(extreme points) attaining the maximum and minimum values of S in component i.
Clearly, the solution to Problem (3.4) is unique in component i if and only if xi,+ = xi,−.
To compute xi,+ and xi,− for all i for a specificM and b, we first calculate an arbitrary
solution xˆ by solving Problem (3.4). Second, we solve 2p Linear Programs of the form
min
x∈S
(
ci,±
)T
x, (3.9)
where ci,± ∈ Rp is ±1 in component i and 0 in all other components.
As noted in Section 1, lack of uniqueness may have profound implications for the
interpretation of the solutions to Problem (3.4). These implications will be discussed in
detail in Section 5, after we provide an example.
4. Numerical example
In this section, we demonstrate the multiplicity of solutions via a numerical example.
Based on the data sources listed in Appendix D, we set up Model (B.1) to replicate the
global gas market in 2012. The model comprises 50 nodes and 291 arcs, distinguishes
the summer and winter half-year, and covers 97% of the global gas production and
consumption. We refrain to go into the details of the modeling and calibration process,
as any parameters fulfilling the criteria listed in the previous sections would qualitatively
lead to the same outcome and therefore the exact values of the parameters are not
relevant for the demonstration of the solution properties. The reason for underlying
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the simulations with real data is merely to generate results which are in the order of
magnitude typically seen in gas market analyses.
We simulated two cases, a Base Case (BC) and a Counterfactual (CF), allowing for
the comparison of (i) multiple solutions in one case, and (ii) the solution spaces of the
two cases. In BC, we increased the market power parameter θCfnt to 0.01 if the calibrated
value was less than 0.01, while leaving all θCfnt ∈ [0.01, 1] at their calibrated values.
This allowed testing whether qCfnt attains a unique result if θ
C
fnt > 0 (Section 3.3), while
avoiding conflicts with the solver’s tolerances4 on one hand, and keeping the impact on
the underlying market behavior low on the other hand. In CF, we changed the traders’
market power parameters θCfnt = 0 for all f, n, t. CF corresponds to the (hypothetical)
situation of perfect competition among all traders in all markets and time periods which
is often taken as benchmark in case studies. We followed the procedure described in
Section 3.3 to determine the solution spaces of BC and CF. The results are shown in
Tables 4.1 and 4.2.
Table 4.1 provides the maximum differences between all possible market equilibria
in BC and CF, grouped by similar variables. We observe that the solution is unique
in the produced volumes qP , the dual variables associated with the capacity constraints
of the services α, the wholesale prices λC , the volume flows contracted by the service
providers sZ , and the service prices λZ . However, the solution is not unique in the other
volume flows (corresponding to the remaining components of q), and the dual variables
associated with the volume balances of the traders φ. Compared to BC, the maximum
differences in CF for the LNG volumes qB and sold volumes qC switch from zero to non-
zero, while all other components remain unique/non-unique. Also, in CF the maximum
differences of the volumes q are larger. The maximum difference in φ is also shown for
the sake of completeness, although this result is not of interest in interpretation.
Table 4.2 compares the minimum and maximum values achieved, xi,− and xi,+, in
BC and CF for selected components i. The examples show that the market equilibrium
in CF can be higher or lower than in BC for the sold volumes qC . For the injected,
extracted and piped volumes qI , qX , and qA, which are ambiguous in BC and CF, the
examples demonstrate that the solution intervals overlap. Thus, in none of the presented
examples a prediction of the market equilibrium is possible when moving from BC to
CF.
5. Discussion
The theoretical results derived in Section 3 and the numerical example presented in
Section 4 provide deep insight in the mathematical structure of Problem (3.4) and allow
drawing conclusions about the uniqueness of the individual components of the solution.
In particular, the numerical example demonstrates how large the difference between two
possible solutions can be in a practical case and thereby emphasizes the importance of
analyzing the entire solution space when carrying out a case study. In the following, we
discuss various aspects of our findings in detail.
As Table 4.1 indicates, the solution is unique in the produced volumes qP , which is
in line with our theoretical findings in Section 3.3 and Appendix C. Furthermore, we
4We used the standard settings of the Gurobi solver for Quadratic Programs (Version 5.6.3).
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Table 4.1: Maximum difference between all possible market equilibria in BC and CF, grouped by vari-
ables: max
i∈J
(
x
i,+
i − x
i,−
i
)
, where J is the index set of the group of variables. All volume flows q and sZ
are given in million cubic meters per day (mcm/d). All prices λC and λZ , as well as the dual variables
α and φ, are given in thousand Euros per million cubic meters (ke/mcm). The table also indicates for
which variable the maximum difference is attained (Attained by trader f , node n/arc nm, period t),
and gives the maximum value attained per group of variables over all simulations (Max. value attained
BC/CF). RU: Russia. UA: Ukraine. AZ: Azerbaijan. NAm: North America. CeA: Central Asia, in-
cluding Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. JP: Japan. DE: Germany. ap: April-September.
oc: October-March.
Group Max. Attained by Max. Attained by Max.
of diff. diff. value
var. in in attained
BC f n m t CF f n m t in BC/CF
qP 0 0 2530
qI 21 RU RU ap 137 RU UA ap 335
qX 21 RU RU - oc 135 RU UA - oc 332
qA 21 RU RU UA ap 171 CeARU UA oc 397
qB 0 43 RU RU JP ap 267
qC 0 186 RU DE oc 2656
α 0 0 237
φ 488 AZ NAm 340 AZ NAm 653
λC 0 0 490
sZ 0 0 2530
λZ 0 0 419
Table 4.2: Comparison of components i of exemplary extreme points xi,+, xi,− of the solution spaces
of BC and CF. BC: Minimum achieved value in component i in BC. BC: Maximum achieved value in
component i in BC. CF : Minimum achieved value in component i in CF. CF : Maximum achieved value
in component i in CF. f : trader. n: (starting) node in which transaction takes place. m: ending node
in which transaction takes place. t: time period. NO: Norway. GB: Great Britain. RU: Russia. CH:
Switzerland. IT: Italy. NL: the Netherlands. DE: Germany. ap: April-September. oc: October-March.
All figures are given in million cubic meters per day (mcm/d).
Variable f n m t BC BC CF CF
qCfnt NO GB - ap 37.6 37.6 24.5 45.5
qCfnt RU CH - ap 0.77 0.77 0 5.06
qIfnt NO IT - ap 7.01 18.9 0 9.77
qXfnt NL IT - oc 4.11 16.5 0 9.68
qAfnmt NO DE CH oc 12.1 24.3 0 14.6
proved in Section 3.3 that the sold volume qCfnt is unique if the corresponding market
power parameter θCfnt > 0; this result was also confirmed by the numerical example
(Table 4.1). From CF in Table 4.1, we see that the ambiguity can be very large if the
market power parameter θCfnt = 0: Some sold volumes q
C
fnt attain solutions as different
as 186mcm/d. As a comparison, Germany, the largest European gas consumer, consumed
293mcm/d during the winter season 2012. Hence, the sold volumes could not be predicted
in general for traders behaving perfectly competitive.
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Fortunately, this is not required for decision-making in most cases; The key variable
in a situation with perfectly competitive traders is the wholesale market price λCnt, which
is unique independently of the market power parameters θCfnt of the traders in node
n and time period t (Table 4.1). However, if some perfectly competitive traders have
high market shares
qCfnt∑
f∈F(n)
qC
fnt
, countries might still be concerned: Traders might develop
strategic behavior over time, and such a transition may induce large changes in the
volume flows, as illustrated by our example (Table 4.2).
Alternatively, by choosing the market power parameter θCfnt > 0 for all traders f
in all nodes n and time periods t we can guarantee uniqueness of the volumes sold qC .
However, the underlying model assumptions leading to this specific, unique qC should
be studied carefully: first, θCfnt > 0 for all f , n, t, implies that all traders in the model
exert market power in all markets and time periods to some extent. We argue that this
is plausible for a real world case, because real markets are imperfect and therefore some
market power can always be exerted by traders. Second, a market power parameter
θCfnt > 0 drives trader f to shift some of its sold volumes away from market n in period t.
This originates from the fact that θCfnt is proportional to a cost on
(
qCfnt
)2
. This becomes
obvious when the inverse demand function ΛCnt(·) is plugged into the Revenue function
(2.2) of the trader. If θCfnt > 0 for all f , n, t, all traders diversify their consumers. Since
we indeed observe that traders diversify their consumers in the real world, for instance
to reduce risks associated with the counter-party, we conclude that θCfnt > 0 for all f ,
n, t can be justified from an economic perspective and the resulting volume sold qCfnt is
well defensible. Hence, in practice it might be preferable to assign a small positive value
to the market power parameter θCfnt of perfectly competitive traders, since the resulting
volumes sold qCfnt are unambiguous and plausible, and the exploration of the solution
space can be circumvented.
The remaining volume flows qZ
′′
, Z ′′ ∈ {I,X,A,B} do not attain unique solutions
in the simulations (Table 4.1). On one hand, we could again achieve uniqueness by
enforcing the elements in the diagonal of D, Dii, to be larger than zero for those i
for which xi = q
Z′′
fzt. This would simplify the interpretation of the results but is not
justifiable from an economic perspective: Dii > 0 implies that the corresponding trader
f diversifies service Z ′′ in z and t, because Dii is a cost on
(
qZ
′′
fzt
)2
. This is slightly
more difficult to see from the model equations (B.1), because no such term on
(
qZ
′′
fzt
)2
existed in the original problem (2.19). However, by adding Diiq
Z′′
fzt to the corresponding
inequality in Model (B.1), the analogy to the term −θCfntSLP
C
ntq
C
fnt in Equation (B.1f)
becomes obvious, which in turn was derived from the Revenue function (2.2) and can
be interpreted as a quadratic cost term as discussed above. However, traders in the
real world often receive quantity discounts from service providers and therefore rarely
diversify. This would correspond to Dii < 0, which would lead to an overall non-convex
problem and is therefore not considered here.
On the other hand, in practice multiple market equilibria can indeed be in line with
a given situation, as illustrated by the following example: assume multiple traders which
are moving gas from one node to another. The two nodes are interconnected by two
15
different paths, of which the path with lower marginal costs is congested. In equilibrium,
the costs for moving gas from one node to the other one are equal for all traders regardless
of the path they are using, because the congestion fee charged on the cheaper path is
equal to the difference in marginal costs of the two paths. Hence, which trader will
eventually use which path in reality is due to factors that cannot at first glance be related
to the model, such as the trader’s preferences, the point in time the capacity is booked,
historical reasons, etc. We therefore recommend not to alter the model structure and
instead analyze the solution space as a whole when the interpretation of these variables
is of interest.
For all other variables we cannot guarantee uniqueness although they are unique in the
presented example, as Table 4.1 indicates. This is particularly disadvantageous when it
comes to the volumes processed by the service providers sZ , and the corresponding service
prices λZ , since these variables are valuable for planning infrastructure expansions. In
fact, we can easily find counterexamples showing that sZ and λZ are not unique in
general: Assume 2 uncongested paths with identical start and end nodes running through
different intermediate nodes. If the marginal costs for gas transportation are equal on
both paths, then multiple optimal sA exist. Now assume a path through 3 nodes, where
the second node is only connected to the start and end node. If both arcs are congested,
λA is not unique; only the sum of all λA of these two arcs is unique [see also 11, p. 231].
Similar examples can also be found for the other services. This said, when models
reproduce a real world network, situations with non-unique sZ and λZ are rare, and
therefore the interpretation of these variables is often facilitated. Nonetheless, the entire
solution space has to be explored to guarantee uniqueness.
Finally, we discuss extensions of our results to more involved models. A first group
comprises the stochastic versions of the WGM introduced by Zhuang & Gabriel [51] and
Gabriel et al. [18]. In these models the intercept INTC and slope SLPC of the inverse
demand functions are randomized (within the usual bounds, INTC > 0 and SLPC < 0),
and the possible realizations are reflected by a scenario tree. Since our results are valid
for any INTC > 0 and SLPC < 0, we can conclude that the decision variables of the
individual tree nodes suffer from the ambiguity described above, and therefore, the overall
outcome of the model is ambiguous as well.
Another popular extension is the introduction of convex logarithmic terms in the
production cost functions. Since the uniqueness-result derived in Appendix C holds for
any strictly convex production cost function, we conclude that the produced volume qP
is also unique for this group of models. Furthermore, the solution space S is polyhedral
and can be described similarly as before (Section 3.3): First, we solve the non-linear
complementarity problem 0  K(x) ⊥ x  0 and obtain a solution xˆ. Second, we
express S by means of K(x), x and xˆ: We set qP = qˆP and insert the numerical values
into K(x), which leads to an affine K(x) = M¯x+ b¯. Finally, we solve the Linear Problem
(3.9) and obtain the extreme points of interest xi,+, xi,− ∈ S.
A further example are the introduced and then dropped constraints (2.10)-(2.13)
on the volume flows qC and qZ . They would be reflected by additional terms in the
KKT conditions (2.19). However, the fundamental properties of matrix M , particularly
positive semi-definiteness and diagonality of M +MT , remain unchanged, and thus the
derived results regarding existence and uniqueness of the solutions extend to models
including constraints (2.10)-(2.13).
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6. Conclusions
In this paper we introduced a SPE-CV model for the natural gas market. We specified
affine costs for the service providers, quadratic costs for gas production, and affine inverse
demand, and hence represented our model as linear complementarity problem. We proved
that a solution to the given problem always exists and derived criteria for uniqueness
of the individual components. Finally, we presented a numerical example confirming
our theoretical findings and illustrating the main difficulties for the interpretation of the
results.
Our findings indicate that most of the relevant variables for decision-making are
unique in the presented model setting. However, one has to be particularly careful
when drawing conclusions about the volume flows between the traders contract with
the service providers, and the traders sell to the consumers if the traders do not exert
market power, since in these cases the model allows multiple market equilibria for a fixed
set of parameter values. The obtained set of solutions S isolates the possible market
equilibria, but which of the equilibria will materialize in practice cannot be predicted
without further specifying the traders’ preferences.
The situation is even more difficult when one tries to compare market equilibria com-
puted under different sets of parameter values: different results for the above quantities
may not be due exclusively to the different parameter values, but also to non-uniqueness
of the solution for each set of parameter values. In the worst case, the direction of
change of some variables is ambiguous, and therefore no trend can be predicted from the
simulation results.
Fortunately, we can guarantee uniqueness in the gas sales of individual traders to
consumers qC , perhaps the most important non-unique variable in the model, by as-
suming that all traders exert at least some market power. Moreover, we showed that a
trader exerting market power over a group of consumers is mathematically equivalent to
a trader diversifying its consumers. Since most of the traders in the real world aim for
some consumer diversification, we conclude that this is a practicable approach to enforce
uniqueness in qC , and that the computed qC is sensible from an economic perspective.
Since our findings are linked to the mathematical structure of the model, they are
not limited to gas markets in particular. Instead, they apply to any other oligopolistic
market which is representable by the introduced model formulation. In fact, the results
also hold if the presented structure is part of a larger model, for instance one including
multiple energy carriers as proposed by Huppmann & Egging [22], and therefore may be
useful in a large field of applications.
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Appendix A. Notation
Table A.1: This table introduces the nomenclature concerning service providers, traders and consumers.
Service providers, traders and consumers
Anm Transmission system operator of pipeline nm
Bnm Shipping company transporting LNG from n to m
Cn Consumer at node n
In Storage operator injecting gas at node n
Ln Liquefaction plant operator at node n
Pn Gas producing company at node n
Rn regasification plant operator at node n
Sn Storage operator at node n
Fn The trader associated with producer at node n
Xn Storage operator extracting gas at node n
Zz Placeholder for a service provider (Pn, In, Xn, Ln, Rn, Anm, Bnm)
at node n / arc nm
Table A.2: This table introduces all sets used for the mathematical description of the model.
Sets
t ∈ T = {T1, . . . , Tt¯} A time period t in the set T of all periods of a year
n,m ∈ N = {N1, . . . , Nn¯} Nodes n,m in the set N of all nodes
f ∈ F = {F1, . . . , Fn¯} A trader f in the set F of all traders
z ∈ Z A node/arc element from the set Z
A ⊂ N ×N Set of arcs connecting 2 nodes by pipeline
B ⊂ N ×N Set of arcs connecting 2 nodes by ship
C ⊆ N Set of nodes at which a consumer is active
I ⊆ N Set of nodes at which storage injection is possible
L ⊆ N Set of nodes at which a liquefaction terminal oper-
ator is active
P ⊆ N Set of nodes at which a gas producer is active
R ⊆ N Set of nodes at which a regasification terminal op-
erator is active
X ⊆ N Set of nodes at which storage extraction is possible
Z ∈ {P ,L,B,R,A, I,X} Placeholder for the set of nodes/arcs at which a
type of service provider is active
A(n) ⊆ N \ {n} Set of nodes which are connected to n by pipeline
B(n) ⊆ N \ {n} Set of nodes which are connected to n by ship
C(f) ⊆ N The set of all nodes with consumers which are
reachable by trader f
N (f) ⊆ N The set of all nodes which are reachable by
trader f
Continued on next page
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Table A.2 – Continued from previous page
Sets
F(z) The set of all traders active at node/arc z
Z(f) The set of all nodes/arcs in which service Z is ac-
tive and are reachable by trader f
S The solution space to Problem (3.4)
Appendix B. Model equations
0 ≤ LINCPnt +QUAC
P
ntq
P
fnt + α
P
nt + α
PT
n − φ
N
fnt ⊥ q
P
fnt ≥ 0 ∀f, n, t (B.1a)
0 ≤ LINC Int + α
I
nt + α
IT
n + φ
N
fnt − φ
S
fn ⊥ q
I
fnt ≥ 0 ∀f, n, t (B.1b)
0 ≤ LINCXzt + α
X
nt + α
XT
n − φ
N
fnt + φ
S
fn ⊥ q
X
fnt ≥ 0 ∀f, n, t (B.1c)
0 ≤ LINCAnmt + α
A
nmt + α
AT
nm − φ
N
fmt + φ
N
fnt ⊥ q
A
fnmt ≥ 0 ∀f, n,m, t (B.1d)
0 ≤LINCLnt + α
L
nt + α
LT
n + LINC
B
nmt + α
B
nmt + α
BT
nm
+LINCRmt + α
R
mt + α
RT
m − φ
N
fmt + φ
N
fnt ⊥ q
B
fnmt ≥ 0 ∀f, n,m, t (B.1e)
0 ≤ −λCnt − θ
C
fntSLP
C
ntq
C
fnt + φ
N
fnt ⊥ q
C
fnt ≥ 0 ∀f, n, t (B.1f)
0 ≤ qPfnt + q
X
fnt +
∑
m∈A(n)
qAfmnt +
∑
m∈B(n)
qBfmnt
−qIfnt − q
C
fnt −
∑
m∈A(n)
qAfnmt −
∑
m∈B(n)
qBfnmt ⊥ φ
N
fnt ≥ 0 ∀f, n, t (B.1g)
0 ≤
∑
t∈T
qIfnt −
∑
t∈T
qXfnt ⊥ φ
S
fn ≥ 0 ∀f, n (B.1h)
0 ≤ CAP
Z
zt −
∑
f∈F(z)
qZfzt ⊥ α
Z
zt ≥ 0 ∀z, t (B.1i)
0 ≤ CAP
ZD
z −
∑
t∈T
∑
f∈F(z)
qZfzt ⊥ α
ZT
z ≥ 0 ∀z (B.1j)
0 ≤ λCnt −

INTCnt + SLPCnt ∑
f∈F(n)
qCfnt

 ⊥ λCnt ≥ 0 ∀n, t (B.1k)
Appendix C. Component-wise uniqueness
Problem (3.4), provided feasible, is equivalent to Problem (C.1).


min xTQx+ bTx
s.t. Mx+ b ≥ 0
x ≥ 0
, where Q =


A 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 E

 , (C.1)
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Table A.3: The parameters are generally described by capital Roman letters, and occasionally by lower-
case Greek letters to follow conventions. The superscripts indicate whether the parameter is related to a
service provider of type Z ∈ {P,L,B,R,A, I,X}, a consumer C, and whether the all periods are covered
(T ). Subscripts indicate the trader f , node/arc z, and the period of the year t the parameter is related
to.
Parameters
CAP
Z
nt Maximum capacity of service Z located at z in period t
CAP
ZT
n Maximum capacity of service Z located at z over all periods T
DMDCnt Reference demand used for construction of the demand curve
INTCnt Maximum willingness to pay of consumers at node n in period t
LINCZzt Linear cost function term for service Z located at z in period t
LOSSZz Loss factor when using service Z located at z
QUACZzt Quadratic cost function term for service Z located at z in period t
SHRCnt,(·) Reference share in demand of domestic, industry and electricity pro-
ducing sectors
SLPCnt Slope of the inverse demand curve of the consumers at node n in
period t, is assumed strictly negative
WTPCnt Reference willingness to pay used for construction of the demand
curve
θCfnt Market power parameter of trader f at node n in period t
ηCnt,(·) Price elasticity of the domestic, industry and electricity producing
sectors
Table A.4: The variables are described by lowercase letters. Primal variables are Roman, while dual
variables are Greek letters. The superscripts indicate whether the variable is related to a service provider
of type Z ∈ {P,L,B,R,A, I,X}, a consumer C, or a node N . Subscripts indicate the trader f the
variable corresponds to, at which node/arc z the transaction or service is located, and in which period
of the year t it takes place.
Variables
qZfzt Flow between trader f and service provider Z at node/arc z in period t
qCfnt Flow of trader f to consumer C at node n in period t
sZzt Volume flow contracted by service provider Z at node/arc z in period t
αZnt Congestion fee of service Z at node n in period t
αZTn Congestion fee on annual usage of service Z at node n
φNfnt Dual variable of the volume balance of trader f at node n and period t
φSfn Dual variable of the annual volume balance of trader f in storage S at
node n
λCnt End consumer price at node n in period t
λZnt Price for utilizing service Z at node n in period t
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Table A.5: This table introduces the functions. The superscripts indicate whether the function is related
to a service provider of type Z ∈ {P,L,B,R,A, I,X}, or a consumer C. Subscripts indicate at which
node n the service/consumer is located, and in which period of the year t the function is valid.
Functions
cZzt(s
Z
zt) Cost function of service Z at node/arc z in period t.
ΛCnt(s
C
nt) Inverse demand function of consumer C at node n in period t.
The properties of A ∈ Rr×r and E imply that Q ∈ Rp×p is diagonal and positive semi-
definite. We are interested in the behavior of the solution xˆ under perturbation of the
diagonal elements of M and Q. The diagonal elements Mii = Qii ∈ Ai ⊂ R
+
0 . A
i is
referred to as the admissible set for element i, for which the problem remains feasible
for all Mii ∈ Ai. We rewrite Problem (C.1) in a more general setting as a parametric
convex program:
P ∗(Mii) =
{
min
xi,xJ
f(xi, xJ ,Mii)
s.t. g(xJ ) + k(xi,Mii) ≥ 0,
(C.2)
where J = {1, . . . , p} \ {i}. Problem (C.2) can be described in the framework of (C.1)
by setting
f(xi, xJ ,Mii) =
∑
j∈J
(
Qjjx
2
j + bjxj
)
+Miix
2
i + bixi (C.3)
g(xJ) + k(xi,Mii) =
[
Mii MiJ
MJi MJJ
]
·
[
xi
xJ
]
+
[
bi
bJ
]
(C.4)
=
[
MiJ
MJJ
]
xJ +
[
Mii
MJi
]
xi +
[
bi
bJ
]
. (C.5)
We base our analysis on Problem (C.2) and on the following assumptions:
(i) xJ 7→ g(xJ ) convex,
(ii) xi 7→ k(xi,Mii) convex for all Mii ∈ RMii≥0,
(iii) (xi, xJ) 7→ f(xi, xJ ,Mii) convex for all Mii ∈ RMii≥0,
Claim. If xi 7→ f(xi, xJ ,Mii) is a strictly convex mapping for all xJ , the optimizer of
Problem (C.2) admits a unique i-component.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, suppose
[
xˆ1i
xˆ1J
]
and
[
xˆ2i
xˆ2J
]
are two optimizers, where
xˆ1i 6= xˆ
2
i . Then, clearly
[
1
2 xˆ
1
i +
1
2 xˆ
2
i
1
2 xˆ
1
J +
1
2 xˆ
2
J
]
is a feasible point with a lower objective value. 
In the specific case of Problem (C.1), note that (i) strict convexity in xi 7→ f(xi, xJ ,Mii)
for all xJ implies Mii > 0, and (ii) the problem is feasible in particular for all Aii ∈
RAii≥0, i ∈ {1, . . . , r}, since there always exists a solution xˆ with xi = 0 for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , r} (Section 3.2).
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Table D.1: Currently available data for model parameters.
Parameter Data source
CAP
P
, CAP
PT
Estimated based on data of sP
CAP
A
ENTSO-G [13], Egging et al. [9], BP [2], EIA [49], Energy
Charter [12]
CAP
L
GLE [19], GIIGNL [29], BP [2]
CAP
R
GLE [19], GIIGNL [29], BP [2]
CAP
I
, CAP
IT
,
CAP
X
GSE [20], CGA [15], EIA [49], TPAC [47], Inogate [26],
Yoshizaki et al. [50], IEA [24]
LINCP , QUACP Egging et al. [9]
LINCA IEA [23], ILF [43]
LINCL Egging et al. [9]
LINCB Egging et al. [9]
LINCR Egging et al. [9]
LINCS Egging et al. [9]
LOSSA IGU [27]
LOSSL Petrowiki [42]
LOSSB Egging et al. [9], Petrowiki [42], GIIGNL [29], Sea-
distances.org [44], SeaRates.com [45]
LOSSR Petrowiki [42], Egging et al. [9]
LOSSS Egging et al. [9]
INTC , SLPC Lise et al. [33], UN [48]
Table D.2: Currently available data for model variables. This data was used for the model calibration.
Variable Data source
qC ,
∑
f∈F(n)
qCfnt, OECD [40], BP [2], EC [14], IEA [25], EIA [49], UN [48]
λC IGU [28], EC [14], IEA [25], EIA [49]
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